explanatory gap

The nature of the explanatory gap has been the subject of some debate.

Pragmatics is concerned with bridging the explanatory gap between sentence meaning and speaker's meaning.

Despite the causal and explanatory gap between the phenomena on different levels, Alexander held that emergent qualities were not epiphenomenal.

In isolation from these underlying realities, we are tempted to fill in the explanatory gap with imagination:

Chalmers argues for an "explanatory gap" from the objective to the subjective, and criticizes physical explanations of mental experience, making him a dualist.

In so doing, he undermines the Dalai Lama's reasoned and balanced approach to the explanatory gap in consciousness studies.

The explanatory gap is generally equated with the hard problem of consciousness, and the question of free will is also considered to be of fundamental importance.

The explanatory gap has vexed and intrigued philosophers and AI researchers alike for decades and caused considerable debate.

The perennial problem of the reductive explainability of phenomenal consciousness - C.D. Broad on the explanatory gap.

This problem of explaining introspective first-person aspects of mental states and consciousness in general in terms of third-person quantitative neuroscience is called the explanatory gap.

These two ways of imagining the two terms of the identity statement are so different it will always seem that there is an explanatory gap whether there is or not.

The "Explanatory gap" - also called the "Hard problem of consciousness" - is the claim that (to date) no one has provided a convincing causal explanation of how and why we are conscious.

We are not able to resolve the explanatory gap because the realm of subjective experiences is cognitively closed to us in the same manner that quantum physics is cognitively closed to elephants.

Some metaphysical thinkers believe that the concept of soul can be a solution for the explanatory gap and the problem of other minds, which suggests that we cannot know if other people really have consciousness.

This argument that there will always be an explanatory gap between an identification of a state in mental and physical terms is compounded, Nagel argues, by the fact that imagination operates in two distinct ways.

Joseph Levine's paper Conceivability, Identity, and the Explanatory Gap takes up where the criticisms of conceivability arguments, such as the inverted spectrum argument and the zombie argument, leave off.

The explanatory gap is a term introduced by philosopher Joseph Levine for the difficulty that physicalist theories of mind have in explaining how physical properties give rise to the way things feel when they are experienced.

Nagel (1974) argues that no amount of physical data is sufficient to provide the "what it is like" of first-person experience, and Chalmers (1996) argues for an "explanatory gap" between functions of the brain and phenomenal experience.

At present, it seems to people that the mental and the physical are irreducibly distinct but that is not a metaphysical insight, or an acknowledgment of an irreducible explanatory gap, but simply where people are at their present stage of understanding.

Robbins argued that, at a certain stage in the development of the subject, an insufficiently restrictive and unifying definition multiplies activities of economists away from filling in explanatory gaps of the theory and solving problems posed by the subject (pp.

A more moderate conception has been expounded by Thomas Nagel, which holds that the mind body problem is currently unsolvable at the present stage of scientific development and that it might take a future scientific paradigm shift or revolution to bridge the explanatory gap.

Naturalistic dualism comes from Australian Philosopher, David Chalmers (born 1966) who argues there is an explanatory gap between objective and subjective experience that cannot be bridged by reductionism because consciousness is, at least, logically autonomous of the physical properties upon which it supervenes.

Consciousness is related to the abstraction of a concept of self over experiences and protocols of the system and the integration of that concept with sensory experience; there is no explanatory gap between conscious experience and a computational model of cognition.

In a review of the book for The Daily Telegraph, British doctor and science writer James Le Fanu was critical, and commented that Taylor did not acknowledge "the explanatory gap" between current understanding of the brain's structure and "what it does, how we think, feel and emote".

Le Fanu concluded, "The paradox of Brainwashing is that it would have been a much more interesting book if Dr Taylor had pursued the contrarian view of seeking to explain why that 'explanatory gap' is not merely unbridged but, with the advance of the neurosciences, now seems to be unbridgeable.