compellence

The issue of compellence is at the heart of the argument made by the limited objectives camp."

Compellence is the best I can do."

Coercion composed of both compellence and deterrence is about action and inaction.

"There is, then, a difference between deterrence and what we might, for want of a better word, call compellence," Mr. Schelling wrote.

Compellence it is.

Professor Dixit notes: "Schelling spells his neologism compellence.

Schelling believes that deterrence does not present "a comprehensive picture of coercion, leading Schelling to introduce the concept of compellence." '

Finally, a military strategy should support the others, explaining how, and under what circumstances, the military instrument of national power will be used to achieve influence, deterrence, defence, or compellence.

Coercive diplomacy, or compellence, is the threat or limited use of force to stop an adversary from doing something or undertake some material change that it otherwise would not have.

Numbers alone do not guarantee attainment of the goals of naval presence, which include, as J.J. Widen has noted, assistance, cooperation, assurance, influence, persuasion, deterrence, compellence, and coercion.

That handwringing about military "compellance" (sometimes spelled "compellence" on the analogy of "deterrence") is to end this week, after the sweeping Yeltsin referendum victory - if the Serbs don't blink.

When I told him the movie Deterrence should really be called Compellence (a better reflection of Thomas Schelling's Nobel prizewinning work on the subject), he started seeing more movies without me.

While deterrence means waiting passively in hope of not seeing a response, compellence is active, thereby, "inducing his withdrawal, or his acquiescence, or his collaboration by an action that threatens to hurt."

After defining escalation, which we all know and I can spell, Congressman Aspin dealt with the new word: "Compellence is the use of military force against an adversary to influence his behavior elsewhere.

Unlike Schelling, George's theory of 'coercive diplomacy' is different than Schelling's 'coercive warfare', in that he believed that coercive diplomacy was "a subset of coercion and compellence."

Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan determined that in 37 attempts between 1946 and 1975 in which U.S. armed forces attempted to influence another country's behavior through non-kinetic deployments, compellence over the long-term (three years or more) succeeded only 19 percent of the time.