akrasia

A person with practical judgment (phronesis) can not have akrasia.

Acrasia is itself a play on the Greek akrasia that describes loss of free will.

Much of the philosophical literature takes akrasia to be the same thing as weakness of the will.

A less esoteric criticism is the matter of Akrasia, or weakness of will.

Aristotle on the other hand took a more empirical approach to the question, acknowledging that we intuitively believe in akrasia.

She contends that akrasia is manifested in different stages of the practical reasoning process.

These he discusses next, under tendencies which are neither vice nor akrasia, but more animal-like.

He specializes in irrationality, akrasia, intentionality and philosophy of action.

In the 19th century, drug addiction was regarded as a sign of akrasia, immorality, or weakness of the will.

It is a technique where someone makes it easier for themselves to avoid akrasia (acting against one's better judgment), particularly procrastination.

Nevertheless it is better to have akrasia than the true vice of akolasia, where intemperate choices are deliberately chosen for their own sake.

Incontinence (akrasia), the opposite of self-restraint.

Another contemporary philosopher, Amélie Rorty (1980) has tackled the problem by distilling out akrasia's many forms.

According to Aristotle, akrasia and self-restraint, are not to "be conceived as identical with Virtue and Vice, nor yet as different in kind from them".

In the dialogue Protagoras, Socrates attests that akrasia is an illogical moral concept, claiming "No one goes willingly toward the bad" (358d).

Savalas stars in her second feature "Akrasia", by Polish director Xavier Tartakiewicz, still in post-production.

Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control.

Thus he expands akrasia to include cases in which the agent seeks to fulfill desires, for example, but ends up denying himself the pleasure he has deemed most choice-worthy.

(2001) "Akrasia, Picoeconomics, and a Rational Reconstruction of Judgment Formation in Dynamic Choice", Philosophical Studies 104, pp.

Other types of failure to master oneself are akrasia only in a qualified sense, for example akrasia "in anger" or "in the pursuit of honor".

She enumerates four types of akrasia: akrasia of direction or aim, of interpretation, of irrationality, and of character.

Socrates believed that akrasia was, strictly speaking, impossible, since we could not want what is bad for us; if we act against our own interests, it must be because we don't know what's right.

They also study the phenomenon of Akrasia, wherein people seemingly act against their best interests and know that they are doing so (for instance, restarting cigarette smoking after having intellectually decided to quit).

Indeed, Davidson expands akrasia to include any judgment that is reached but not fulfilled, whether it be as a result of an opinion, a real or imagined good, or a moral belief. "